The main objective of this study is examining how firm-specific factors and entry mode choice (including the non-conventional forms) of Japanese multinational enterprises determine the financial performance of their Australian subsidiaries. We expect that the firm will make choices regarding the FDI strategy in such a way as to make the best possible use of its resources in achieving its FDI goals. Our results show that the Trinational IJV and Traditional JV modes were the least successful choices, while Intrafirm JV entries were the most likely to show a financial gain followed by Cross-national DJV and Wholly own entry mode.
INTRODUCTION
Hypothesis 5: The Japanese firm's experience in the host market will be associated with better performance by the FDI in that country.
A problem comes when foreign employers' expectations clash with local employees' expectations. With the enormous increase in cross-border corporate integration over the recent years, this problem is looming increasingly large (Segalla, 2001) . A parent's human resources endowment may also affect its performance. When a foreign firm goes abroad, it has to deal with a staff of employees, with their own routines and culture. Integrating such employees is difficult, particularly so if there are cultural differences between the two countries (Hennart and Reddy, 1997) . The management of the subsidiary's labor force can therefore be left to the local manager (Hennart and Reddy, 1997) . Hence performance will be greater when the subsidiary's manager is non Japanese.
Hypothesis 6: Subsidiaries with non Japanese managers will exhibit better performance.
Costs and benefits initialized, when the entry mode decisions are made, will be reflected in the subsequent performance of the venture. Thus, a correct decision on entry mode should improve a company's long-term performance (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) . Similarly, a mode inappropriately chosen will lead to high transaction costs and low transaction benefits, conditions under which a venture's performance will suffer (Chen and Hu, 2002) . In the hierarchical model of market entry modes, the wholly owned entry can be categorized into the equity based entry modes, because it requires a major recourse commitment in the overseas location (Pan and Tse, 2000) . One advantage of a wholly owned investment is the transferring of firm-specific advantages to a foreign market, without the risk of losing control over that competence. This is especially the case when a firm's competitive advantage is based on technological know-how which is one of the core competencies of a firm. (Hennart and Park, 1993) . Another advantage of wholly owned investments is that they give a firm tight control over operations in different countries, which is necessary in a global strategy.
Hypothesis 7-a: Wholly owned investments achieve higher financial performance than other entry mode types.
Establishing a wholly owned subsidiary is a very costly way of entering a foreign country.
Companies must bear the full costs of setting up a new plant, finding suitable employees, costs of learning different government restriction and different law systems. Overall wholly owned investment can be a very risky market entry mode, as the investors may have to carry the risk of sunk cost alone in a new and uncertain marketplace. In the other hand, Equity International Joint Ventures (JV's) are a very popular entry mode, especially in the Asia/Pacific area. Despite this popularity, they seem to have poor performance records and high failure rates. Scholars found a less then 50% survival rate (Zeira and Newburry, 1999) . The main idea behind an IJV is that the transaction costs of entering a foreign market are much lower then those faced when establishing a wholly owned subsidiary. The entering firm is able to benefit from the local partners knowledge of the host country's competitive conditions, culture, language, political and business systems. Joint venture ownership structure has traditionally been defined by the percentage of equity held by the foreign parent. Where the foreign parent has a greater than 50 percent equity stake, the JV is called a majority-owned JV. If ownership is equal to 50%, the JV is considered co-owned, and if the equity holding is less than 50%, the JV is identified as a minority-owned (Makino and Delios, 1996) . Some rare studies explicitly identified and considered JVs that were formed by multiple partners, or JVs that were formed between a foreign firm and a partner not based in the host country (Hennart, 1988) . However, the international joint venture literature has focused on two parent JVs formed between one foreign and one local firm. But other types of JVs exist. Makino and Beamish (1998) introduced new forms of JVs that are frequently occurring. They introduced a new typology which looks at JVs formed by multiple (three or more) firms; with non-local firms (home-and third country based firms); and by affiliated firms (JVs formed between the parent firm and its domestic or foreign subsidiaries). See Figure 1 However, subsidiary performance is also threatened by cultural differences. That's why it is important to take into account the moderating effects of cultural distance and to improve our understanding of how culture impacts performance. Previous researches (Birkinshaw and Hood's, 1998) came to the conclusion that the foreign subsidiary development and performance depend on parent company, subsidiary, and host country factors. Yet, cultural differences moderate these relationships and may even eliminate the ability of MNEs to create or make use of valuable resources (Uhlenbruck, 2004) . 
METHODOLOGY

Scope of the study
The main objective of this study examines how firm-specific factors and entry mode choice of Japanese multinational enterprises determine the performance of their Australian subsidiaries. This paper suggests that different entry modes have different performance outcomes based upon their resource and organizational control demands. Likewise, we assume that firm-specific factors are able to exert influence over the performance of the Japanese subsidiaries in Australia.
Sample
The data used for this study was obtained from Toyo Keizai Inc., Japanese overseas investment, listed by country, (Toyo Keizai Inc., 1992 -2001 . The data for the independent variables are derived from Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan, Toyo Keizai Inc., Japanese overseas investment, listed by firms and the Japan Company Handbook, when unavailable from the former source. In this study, only operations in the Australian market were examined. The basic selection criteria were that a subsidiary had to be established between 1992 and 2002
Dependent variable
The dependent variable, subsidiary performance, is a three-point item assessing the subsidiary's financial performance in 2001. The scale points were (1) Gain, (2) break-even, and (3) loss.
Independent variables
Following the recommendations of previous work, we took a step toward developing a more comprehensive theory by investigating the influence of firm-specific factors and entry mode on performance.
We also made a distinction between the types of entry mode by using non-conventional entry mode types. Concerning the explanatory effects, we use the following set of independent variables.
Entry mode variables
FDI entries with at least 95 percent Japanese ownership are categorized as wholly owned subsidiaries; and as international joint venture (IJV) if otherwise (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) . In this paper, non conventional types of entry mode were also used. Makino and Beamish (1998) introduced four distinct forms of JVs based on the JVs partners' nationality and equity affiliation. JVs A variable, TRAENTRY, to check whether the type of entry mode also affects the performance, was added to the multinomial logistic regression. This dummy variable is equal to one if the entry mode type is a Traditional JV or a Trinational IJV, and zero otherwise.
Firm-specific variables
The product differentiation variable is a dummy variable equal to one, if one of the products manufactured by the subsidiary was also produced by the parent, and zero otherwise (COMMON).
Natural logarithm of the parent's Capital is used to provide more comparable scale units as other variables used in the model (SIZEMOTH). This variable captures the parent size at entry. The data was obtained from the issue of Toyo Keizai Inc., a complete listing by firms; and the Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan database published in the year before the corresponding Japanese entry. This variable is a proxy of the parent company's size. Capital intensity in a foreign invested enterprise is reflected in the total investment committed to a project (RELATIVE). It is the relative ratio of the size (investment) of the subsidiary to the size (Capital) of the parent company. RELATIVE is used to provide more comparable scale units as other variables used in the model. A dummy variable, equal to one if the subsidiary is in a resource-based industry and zero otherwise (INDUSTRY) is also used. The international experience variable is a dummy variable, equal to one if the parent company had an experience in the same country (EXPERIEN).
Control variable
A socio-cultural distance variable is also used. It is a dummy variable indicating whether the subsidiary's manager is Japanese or not (MANAGER). Because nationality and cultural groups are good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management, the variables MANAGER was added.
RESULTS
The analytical framework in this study is implemented in two stages. First, we attempt to establish the relationship between prescribed modes of entry and their impact on performance.
In the second stage of the analysis, we verify the influence of the firm specific factors, the entry mode type variable and the control variable on the choice of entry mode.
Because of the nature of the dependent variable, a three-point item, which violates a fundamental assumption of Ordinary Least Squares regression (that the dependent variable is normally distributed), we use a multinomial logistic regression, which is more appropriate in such cases (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992 ) . Table 1 gives statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in the study. The matrix of the independent variables suggests little collinearity. Almost all correlations are low, the two highest coefficients being the ones between EXPERIEN and SIZEMOTH (.417) and between MANAGER and INDUSTRY (.316).
Analyzing the results of the cross-tabulation analysis Table 2 illustrates the results of the classification. In our sample, 131 (62.7%) were wholly owned, 33 (15.8%) were Traditional JVs, 20 (9.6%) were Intrafirm JVs, 22 (10.5%) were Crossnational DJVs, and 3 (1.4%) were Trinational IJVs. The first column from the left lists the number of partners. In this sample, the number of two-partner venture represented less than 28% of the total cases and 71% of the total JVs. Almost 30% of the JVs had three or more partners. Table 3 provides the results of the cross-tabulation analysis which examined the relationship between financial performance and ownership structure. Marginal frequencies show that 64.1% of the subsidiaries were profitable, while 22.5% had a loss in 2001. Intrafirm JVs had the best performance, 85% of Intrafirm JVs were classified as profitable, or "gain." Among the other four entry types, Crossnational DJVs had the second best performance (63.6%), followed by Wholly Own (63.4%) and Traditional JVs (57.6%). Trinational IJVs were the worst performers with 66.7% of unprofitable cases.
The goodness-of-fit of the independence model was significant, with a chi-Square significance=0.030. This result suggests that there was a significant difference in performance among the five ownership structures.
Analyzing the results of the multinomial logistic regression
The results of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in Tables 4. Overall, the data supported the model, although some specific hypotheses were not supported. The table shows the values of the coefficients and the level of significance of each independent variable for predicting a subsidiary's performance as Gain or Break-even. Loss is not reported because only two equations are determined for a three-level dependent variable in multinomial logistic regression. However, the loss coefficients would be the same magnitude as the Gain coefficients but in the opposite direction (Konopaske et al., 2002) . In addition, the number of cases correctly predicted by the model, the chisquare of the model, the value of the likelihood function and the expected signs of the variables are reported as well. The table reports the results for the full sample. The model has a high overall explanatory power, a chi-square of 34.735 (0.002) COMMON, SIZEMOTH, TRAENTRY and MANAGER were all found to be significant predictors of subsidiary's profitable performance (Gain). The variable EXPERIEN is, however, significantly negatively related to break-even. With the exception of MANAGER and EXPERIEN, significant variables have the predicted signs. The coefficient of COMMON is positive and significant; this means that when the parent also produced one of the products manufactured by the subsidiary, the international venture will perform better. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, SIZEMOTH is positively related to profitable performance. The coefficient of MANAGER, our measure of endowment in human resources is significant, but entering with a negative sign, suggesting that with a Japanese manager the subsidiary will perform better. This contradicts hypothesis 6 which conjectured that subsidiaries with non Japanese managers will exhibit better performance. As predicted by Hypothesis 7-c, the coefficient of TRAENTRY is significant but entering with a negative sign, suggesting that the traditional and trinational entry types tend to achieve lower financial performance than other entry mode types.
In contradiction to what was hypothesized, EXPERIEN is negatively related to profitable performance, but not at a statistically significant level. The variable is, however, significantly negatively related to break-even.
The coefficient of INDUSTRY and RELATIVE are insignificant, suggesting that the type of industry and the size of the investment do not increase the probability that the Japanese subsidiary will exhibit better performance, as we suggested in hypothesis 1, and 4.
DISCUSSION
Using a sample of 209 Japanese firms entering Australia over the period 1992-2002, our results show the model correctly predicts over 66% of the mode choices. Thus, we provide strong initial evidence to support using firm specific factors and ownership structures to predict subsidiaries performance. Our analysis showed that Intrafirm JVs provided the greatest opportunity to achieve superior performance, and Trinational IJVs had the greatest likelihood of Loss; Cross-national DJVs and Wholly own provided the second highest opportunity for attaining superior performance, and compared to Traditional IJVs, they attain a superior performance. These results suggest that management complexity from inter-partner cultural distance may have a significant impact on the performance of the subsidiary.
Our result suggests that sharing the costs of the FDI with partners from the same culture, or even better, from the same group, was the critical factor that improved performance. Cultural distance at both country and corporate levels was strongly related to the performance of the FDI. Thus we provide an empirical support for previous studies (Makino and Beamish, 1998) 
that Intrafirm JVs and
Cross-national DJVs with a small cultural distance between the partners perform better then other types of entry modes. Previous studies have found that an Intrafirm JV and a Cross-national DJV represent longer-term solutions for attaining JV success. A Trinational IJV is usually the least desirable of the ownership-structure types, as it incurs the highest termination rate and achieves the lowest performance (Makino and Beamish, 1998) .
The variable related to the endowment in human resources shows that a manager's nationality influences the profitability of an international investment. The coefficient of MANAGER is positive, contrary to what was expected. When nationality and cultural group assume a crucial role, when they are good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management and when the competitive success of the firm depends on the capability of the company to manage them, a Japanese manager represents the best solution.
Conversely, very large firms' subsidiaries show a propensity towards high profits. Although previous empirical results have been conflicting, there is some support for the position that organizations that are large, face less turbulent environments, and have a higher mass output orientation. (Mutelli and Piscitello, 1998) . Likewise, the fact that the affiliate produces a product also manufactured by the parent seems to affect positively the performance. When the parent company is diversifying trough a FDI, uncertainty and information costs may be higher, so that less gain will be generated. That is shown by the positive sign of the variable COMMON. As conjectured in hypothesis 2, financial performance will be higher when the Japanese shareholder is in the same industry as the planned subsidiary. Results show also that the proxies of the different aspects of the firm's experience in managing foreign operations due to previous FDI undertaken in the same country (EXPERIEN) negatively influence the propensity to get a high profit (although this variable is significant only in the case of Break-even).
The type of industry INDUSTRY and the relative size RELATIVE have no impact on the subsidiary's performance.
CONCLUSION
This study examined the influence of firm specific advantages and entry mode choice on performance. This paper examines these issues by answering the following questions. First, when investing in Australia, how do Japanese's firm specific factors affect the performance? Second, what is the impact of entry modes on performance of these investment projects?
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: When the parent company has the same product as the established subsidiary, its subsidiary will exhibit a high profit. Likewise, very large firms' subsidiaries show a propensity toward high profits. We also found that the probability of subsidiary's loss increases when the parent company has experience in the Australian market and when the subsidiary's manager in Australia is non Japanese.
This research examines also the performance of entry modes that have been rarely considered in previous studies. The Trinational IJV mode was the least successful choice, while Intrafirm JV entries were the most likely to show a financial gain followed by Cross-national DJV and Wholly own entry mode.
Nevertheless, this study also has limitations. The empirical study was conducted using the samples of Japanese subsidiaries in Australia only. This restricted the study to the behavior of onenationality parents in one host market. Future studies may be able to conduct more extensive tests with the samples including multiple-nationality parents in one host country or one-nationality parents in several host countries. Also other studies could use a firms' direct response rather than secondary data as input in conducting a relatively large-scale empirical investigation of this topic. Finally, Joint effects of firm-specific advantages and entry mode on performance rest to be undertaken. The findings of this study provide the implication of firm specific factors and of the importance of entry mode decision on performance. Although each entry mode has different performance profile, performance of subsidiaries is also affected by the fit between the parent firm's-specific advantages and entry mode choice.
Although this study has its limitations, it has clearly provided a theoretical and practical insight into the factors affecting the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Other studies could use our research as a basis to extend work in this area toward a better understanding of the link between foreign entry mode, firm specific-advantages and subsidiary performance. Table  Table Table  Table 1 Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2 1.4%
* in two cases, the percentage of the main Japanese investor was over the threshold of 95% (wholly own) but less than 100%, and the rest was brought from a partner. Table 3  Table 3  Table 3  Table 3 
